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Van Penick* Legal Framework in The
Canadian Offshore
In this article, the author examines the legal framework in effect in the Atlantic
Canada offshore through a comparative analysis of the Western Canada onshore
regime in five basic areas: property rights, oil and gas rights, the constitutional
division of oil and gas authority, basic agreements and the application of laws.
The major differences exposed by this analysis should aid east coast oil and gas
practitioners in properly advising their clients.
Dans cetarticle, I'auteureffectue une analyse comparative ducadre r6glementaire
r6gissant le secteur p~trolier extrac6tier au Canada Atlantique et du r6gime
r6gissantle secteurp~trolier des provinces de I'Ouest en examinant cinq aspects
fondamentaux : les droits de propri~t6, les droits p6troliers et gaziers, la
r6partition constitutionnelle des comp6tences en matiere d'exploration et
d'exploitationp6trolibre tgaziere, les accords fondamentaux etl'application des
lois et rbglements. Les grandes diffdrences mises en lumi6re par cette analyse
sont susceptibles d'6clairer les praticiens du secteur p6trolier de la c6te Est
appelds b fournir des conseils b leurs clients.
* Partner, McInnes Cooper.
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Legal Framework in The Canadian Offshore
Introduction
The foundation, development and application of oil and gas law off the
east coast of Canada is fundamentally different from onshore resource
law. Its source is different. Different constitutional principles apply. A
largely different set of laws governs and a largely different regulatory
regime oversees exploration, development and production activities.
Not too long ago, resource-related legal issues on the continental shelf
were characterized by uncertainty. With sporadic legislation and virtu-
ally no case law, legal advisors and writers had to tread cautiously,
reaching only tenuous conclusions and hedging legal advice against a
considerable vacuum of useful precedent. In the last ten years, however,
industry interest and activity have prompted legislators and regulators to
focus on the offshore. A large body of statute and case law assists
industry, practitioners and the judiciary in Saskatchewan, Alberta and
British Columbia in developing and refining oil and gas law in those
provinces. As oil and gas companies and their advisors turn some of their
attention, skills and experience eastward, it may be useful to compare the
basic principles of the well-established western oil and gas law model
with the developing offshore model.
I. Property Rights Generally
The first step in the analysis of oil and gas rights is the determination of
the fundamental nature and extent of property rights recognized by the
operative legal systems onshore and offshore.
1. Onshore
Rights in land began to be defined in the earliest days of the common law
through the development of the system of tenure. According to Halsbury's
Laws of England citing Coke Upon Littleton,
[t]echnically, land is not the subject of absolute ownership but of tenure
.... This tenure is either under the Crown directly, or under some mesne
lord, or a succession of mesne lords, who, or the first of whom, holds of the
Crown. Thus the monarch is lord paramount, either mediate or immediate,
of all land within the realm.'
1. Vol. 39(2), 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1998) at 7.
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Thus, the sovereign is the source of all real property rights. The system
by which the sovereign parcelled out these rights was the system of tenure
and within that system the rights contained in a grant in fee simple were
the highest and most complete. "An estate in fee simple approaches as
near to absolute ownership as the system of tenure will allow .... "2
A classic statement of the complete bundle of rights enjoyed by the
tenant in fee simple is found in Challis Law of Real Property:
A fee simple is the most extensive in quantum, and the most absolute in
respect to the rights which it confers, of all estates known to the law. It
confers, and since the beginning of legal history it always has conferred,
the lawful right to exercise over, upon, and in respect to, the land, every act
of ownership which can enter into the imagination...
More recently, E.H. Burn wrote in Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law of
Real Property,
the common law principle is that a tenant in fee simple is owner of
everything in, on and above his land. As Lord Wilberforce said:
At most the maxim is used as a statement, imprecise enough, of the
extent of the rights, prima facie, of owners of land: Bowen LJ was
concerned with these rights when... he said "Prima facie the owner
of the land has everything under the sky down to the centre of the
earth."
The rights are as extensive as common law and statute permit.4
In granting land in fee simple the Crown could and often did retain to
itself certain rights, for example, rights to gold and silver. Also a grant
in fee simple would be limited to interests which the law deemed capable
of ownership, so that, for instance, rights to water in underground rivers
and to wild animals in forests were excluded under a normal fee simple
deed. For centuries the grant in fee simple has operated to convey pretty
much the same bundle of rights: the right to possession, to the use of the
land, to reconvey or bequeath the land, the right to lease and generally the
right to take minerals and other resources out of the ground, to separate
them from their original state and to possess and process, use or sell them.
Such was the bundle of rights the Canadian Pacific Railway received in
1900 when the Crown granted to it a 24-mile wide swath of land in fee
simple between British Columbia and Ontario, in return for the construc-
tion of the cross-Canada railway.
2. Ibid. at 76.
3. 3d ed. (London: Butterworth & Co., 1911) at 218.
4. 15th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 162, citing CommissionerforRailways v. Valuer-
General, [1974] A.C. 328 at 351-2 (P.C.); Pountney v. Clayton (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 820 at 838
(C.A.); and Rolfe v. Wimpey Waste Management, [1988] S.T.C. 329 at 357 per Harman J.
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2. Offshore
Not long after the common law had developed the onshore system of
tenure, maritime law addressed ownership rights in the world's oceans.
Jurisdiction over the high seas was a hot topic in the seventeenth century.
Grotius's Mare Liberum of 1609 advocated that the high seas were
beyond the jurisdiction of any nation. Selden's Mare Clausum of 1631
supported the sixteenth century claims of Spain and other nations to
exclusive rights of ownership and navigation in huge portions of the
world's seas. By the end of the eighteenth century, the doctrine of the
freedom of the high seas had prevailed.' A new and ultimately successful
assault on the concept of the freedom of the high seas developed in the
twentieth century as the technological ability of society to exploit the
continental shelf became reality.
In the 1984 Hibernia Reference6 the Supreme Court of Canada
confirmed that the continental shelf is, and always has been, beyond and
not part of the territory of Canada.' Indeed it was not until 1958, or a very
short time before then, that international law recognized coastal state
rights in the continental shelf. Article 2(1) of the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf provides as follows:
The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
This exact wording was repeated in art. 77(1) of the 1982 United Nation's
Convention on the Law of the Sea and with slight modification in s. 18 of
the OceansAct.8 This principle of international law forms the basis of all
continental shelf rights off the coasts of Canada. As the Supreme Court
of Canada stated in the Hibernia Reference,
[n]either Canada nor Newfoundland made any claims to the continental
shelf prior to the codification of the regime in the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion. The rights claimed are those accorded by operation of international
law.9
5. See P.C. Jessup, The Law ofTerritorial Waters andMaritime Jurisdiction (New York: G.A.
Jennings Co., 1927), ch. 1.
6. Reference Re the Seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf offshore Newfoundland
(1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Hibernia Reference].
7. Hibernia Reference, ibid. at 396.
8. S.C. 1996, c. 31.
9. Hibernia Reference, supra note 6 at 395.
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3. Summary
Onshore rights are summed up by the ancient and encompassing maxim:
cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos; the owner of land
has everything under the sky down to the centre of the earth. In addition
to the infinite geographical extent to real estate ownership, the rights
which owners can exercise over their land are equally broad, extending
to every act which can enter into the imagination.
The foundation of continental shelf rights is much narrower. Geo-
graphically, the coastal state has no ownership of the water above the
shelf, although Canada has asserted rights to the natural resources in the
water column through the exclusive economic zone provisions of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and s. 14 of the
Oceans Act. Within the seabed and the subsoil, the coastal state' s rights
are restricted to the rights to explore the continental shelf and to exploit
its natural resources.
I1. The Legal Character of Oil and Gas Rights
Broad onshore and narrower on the continental shelf, we turn to an
examination of the legal character of onshore and offshore oil and gas
rights.
1. Onshore
After a half century of judicial hesitancy, Canada has finally adopted the
absolute ownership theory of oil and gas as originally expounded in the
state of Texas. 10 The owner of a fee simple estate in land in Canada,
except in provinces where the Crown has by statute reserved oil and gas
rights, owns the oil and gas in place (in situ) under that land. Judicial
recognition of this principle has been slow in coming because of the
migratory nature of oil and gas. Earlier courts had reflected the earlier
scientific theories that oil and gas flowed freely in underground channels
and found that like water in underground rivers, oil and gas were
incapable of ownership until reduced to possession.
Scientific evidence has now established that useful oil and gas reserves
are trapped under, and contained within impermeable helmets of rock.
The fluid and gaseous nature of the hydrocarbons allows them to move
freely within the rock helmet, but they cannot escape it. Borys v.
10. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W. 2d 558 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1948).
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Canadian Pacific Railway and Imperial Oil"1 is to oil and gas law what
Donoghue v. Stevenson is to negligence. In Borys the Privy Council came
close to adopting the absolute ownership theory in 1953:
For the purpose of their decision their Lordships are prepared to assume
that the gas whilst in situ is the property of the appellant even though it has
not been reduced to possession .... 11
The Privy Council also specifically endorsed these words from the
Alberta Court of Appeal decision from which Borys had appealed:
What was reserved to the railway company was petroleum in the earth and
not a substance when it reached the surface. It is true that, by change of
pressure and temperature, gas is released from solution when the liquid is
brought to the surface but such a change ought not to affect the original
ownership....
In my opinion, all the petroleum reserve including all hydrocarbons in
solution or contained in the liquid in the ground, is the property of the
defendants . ,3
In Prism Petroleum v. Omega Hydrocarbons, Stratton J.A. interpreted
Borys as follows:
The Privy Council held, inter alia, that as a matter of construction the
reservation of petroleum included gas in solution in the liquid state as it
existed in the earth, and was the property of Imperial Oil Limited as the
entity entitled to the petroleum under the leased lands. 14
Finally, in Anderson v. Amoco Oil & Gas, Fruman J., in a most detailed
and interesting decision, stated:
I consider it unnecessary, in order to decide the issues in this case, to make
a determination of ownership theory. Should a determination of the
respective ownership rights of the petroleum and non-petroleum owners
be necessary, it must be consistent with Borys, Prism, Moore C.J.'s order,
and the reservation. The reservation was made prior to human disturbance
and divided oil and gas in their natural conditions in strata between the
petroleum and non-petroleum owners, with neither retaining a reversion-
ary interest in the others' hydrocarbons. The only reasonable ownership
theory on which to proceed is that the petroleum reserved is owned as a fee
simple interest in situ by the petroleum owner, and the gas is owned as a
fee simple interest in situ by the non-petroleum owner, subject to the rule
of capture as modified by conservation legislation and subject to the
petroleum owners' right to use the gas in recovering petroleum. 5
11. (1953), 7 W.W.R. (NS) 546 (P.C.) [hereinafter Borys].
12. Borys, ibid. at 559.
13. Ibid. at 556.
14. [1994] 6 W.W.R. 585 (Alta. C.A.) at 594.
15. [1999] 3 W.W.R. 255 (Alta. S.C.) at 293 [hereinafter Anderson].
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The opening words of the above quotation render the judge's conclusion
with respect to the ownership theory obiter, but the decision proceeds to
consider in a manner central to the case a necessary corollary to the
ownership theory - the rule of capture.
If the boundary between adjacent landowners straddles a common
reservoir of hydrocarbons, it will be possible for one landowner to drill
for and produce oil or gas which may migrate away from its original
location under the land of the neighbour toward the production well. The
rule of capture protects the producing neighbour from a claim of conver-
sion or theft. The rule provides that despite the absolute ownership of oil
and gas in place under a landowner's property, an adjacent landowner
will not be liable for extracting the first landowner's oil or gas, provided
that the adjacent landowner does so (a) without trespass on the first
landowner's land and (b) without negligence in conducting production
activities. Accordingly, while the Supreme Court of Canada has not
embraced the absolute ownership theory, case law has developed suffi-
ciently to confirm the absolute ownership theory of oil and gas, as
modified by the rule of capture, as a basic principle of onshore oil and gas
law in Canada.
In the Anderson case, Fruman J. discussed the rule of capture in an
interesting context, where title to oil has been separated from title to gas.
The Canadian Pacific Railway's (CPR) reservation of coal, petroleum
and valuable stone in its 1906 deed to Borys was typical of the convey-
ancing at the time, so that eventually many oil companies taking standard
oil and gas leases from CPR, like Imperial Oil in Borys, held the right to
explore and produce "petroleum". The Privy Council in Borys decided
that "petroleum" means oil but does not include natural gas. Accord-
ingly, the landowner in the typical situation ends up with the natural gas.
Further, Borys also recognizes that in its untouched state within the
reservoir, petroleum contains natural gas in solution. As the pressure is
reduced when the petroleum is produced, the gas bubbles out of the oil.
Borys stands for the proposition that the 1906 reservation contemplated
a reservation to CPR of petroleum in the ground in its natural state, and
that therefore solution gas belongs to the owner of the petroleum, whether
it is in solution in the oil under the original pressure of the reservoir or
whether the gas has bubbled out of the oil either into the gas cap at the top
of the reservoir or into the production well. This splitting of title to
hydrocarbons between the oil held by the oil companies and the gas held
by the landowner has led to a considerable body of litigation and scholarly
writing.
The novel argument was made in Anderson that the release of solution
gas from the oil (typically belonging to the oil company) into the gas cap
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(typically belonging to the landowner) had the same legal effect as gas or
oil migrating from one landowner's side of a common reservoir to the
other side, namely that the rule of capture applies to make the owner of
the natural gas the owner of solution gas which has migrated into the gas
cap. Fruman J., referring to the gas bubbling out of the oil as pressure is
reduced as a "change in phase conditions", concluded firmly that the rule
of capture does not apply in split title migrations:
The rule of capture is narrow ... it deals with the migration of substances
between two tracts of land, qualifying the ownership of the person who
loses the hydrocarbons and confirming the non-liability of the person who
acquires them. The plaintiffs seek to rely upon it to support ownership in
a situation involving a change in phase condition of substances within a
single tract of land. There is no justification for such an extension. The
rule of capture is not relevant to a determination of oil and gas ownership
in split title cases. 6
2. Offshore
The legal character of oil and gas in the continental shelf is determined
by the meaning of a coastal state's sovereign right to explore the
continental shelf and exploit its natural resources. The Supreme Court of
Canada has discarded the application of onshore proprietary rights to the
continental shelf:
We do not think continental shelf rights are proprietary in the ordinary
sense. In the words of the 1958 Geneva Convention, they are "sovereign
rights" and they appurtain to the coastal State as an extension of rights
beyond where its ordinary sovereignty is exercised. In pith and substance
they are an extra-territorial manifestation of, and an incident of, the
external sovereignty of a coastal State.' 7
It is difficult to draw useful analogies from onshore resource law to
help characterize these "new" continental shelf rights. There has been no
case law or commentary to assist in the definition of these rights. Does
Canadian law recognize absolute ownership of oil and gas in situ within
the continental shelf? This question has not been addressed directly but
the answer is probably no. The continental shelf is not "owned" by
Canada; it is not part of Canada. Instead of the Crown being the lord
paramount of all land, the international law of the continental shelf
represents a careful balance of nations with competing interests - nations
whose fishing fleets are accustomed to travelling thousands of miles to
the most prolific fisheries, nations whose communications companies lay
transatlantic wire and fiberoptic cable, nations whose container lines,
16. Anderson, ibid. at 306.
17. Hibernia Reference, supra note 6 at 396.
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tankers and predecessor vessels have plied the high seas for a thousand
years.
The necessary rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the
continental shelf will probably be confined to the minimum extent
necessary to exercise those fights in an efficient and productive manner.
Keeping them to a useful minimum will help maintain the proper balance
among the competing interests of navigation, fishing, communications
and natural resources such as oil and gas.
Will these rights be characterized as real property rights? Again the
answer is not known, and again it is suggested that the applicable test will
be to determine whether the characterization of the rights will constitute
a reasonable minimum, necessary to permit a commercially reasonable
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf oil and gas resources.
However, the real versus personal property distinction may not be
relevant in the offshore; it certainly will not be as important a distinction
as it is onshore. Onshore, one of the chief distinctions between real and
personal oil and gas rights is that the former run with the land and bind
subsequent owners of it. In the offshore, the oil and gas rights comprise
pretty much all of the "proprietary" rights there are, so that there are no
other rights to attach oil and gas rights to; there is nothing for them to run
with. Also, onshore registry systems differentiate between real and
personal property. Offshore rights to explore for, develop and produce
oil and gas are governed by federal legislation (governing the Newfound-
land offshore: the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementa-
tion Act;" and the Nova Scotia offshore the Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, 9 collec-
tively the Accord Acts). These statutes establish a single registry for
exploration, significant discovery and production licences, together with
interests therein. Characterization as real or personal property is not a
criterion for registration under the Accord Acts' registries. Accord Act
licences are limited in time and subject to forfeiture, so that the conse-
quences of binding subsequent holders of interests are much less
significant.
3. Summary
Onshore, the full complement of real property rights has led Canada to
accept the theory of absolute ownership of oil and gas. The rule of
capture, a necessary corollary to the theory, operates in recognition of the
migratory nature of oil and gas. Offshore, Canadian law recognizes oil
and gas rights which are not proprietary in the ordinary sense. Their
18. S.C. 1987, c. 3 [hereinafter Newfoundland Accord Act].
19. S.C. 1988, c. 28 [hereinafter Nova Scotia Accord Act].
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character has not been refined any further but will develop within the
limitations imposed by the less than all-encompassing sovereign rights to
explore and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf, and by
the balance of international interests in the high seas.
III. Constitutional Division of Oil and Gas Rights and Powers
Having outlined the nature of the rights in oil and gas recognized both
onshore and offshore, the next task is to determine which level of
government in Canada has proprietary rights and legislative powers with
respect to oil and gas.
1. Onshore
At the time of confederation, the heart of provincial wealth and power was
the land and its resources. Section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and
its later counterparts as additional provinces entered confederation,
conferred on the provinces all lands, mines, minerals and royalties in the
broadest sense:
The enactments of sect. 109 are, in the opinion of their Lordships,
sufficient to give to each Province, subject to the administration and
control of its own Legislature, the entire beneficial interest of the Crown
in all lands within its boundaries.... ."
To support and manage the proprietary rights given to the provinces,
s. 92(5) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives provinces the exclusive right
to make laws with respect to the management and sale of public lands, and
s. 92(13) gives the provinces power over property and civil rights in the
province. Finally, s. 92(16) gives the provinces general power over all
matters of a merely local or private nature. Accordingly, broad rights and
powers relating to land and the resources within them were vested in and
placed under the control of the provinces. This cornerstone of provincial
wealth and power has eroded under the ever increasing federal trade and
commerce powers and federal jurisdiction over interprovincial works
and undertakings, but the basic control and regulation of a province's oil
and gas reserves has remained solidly within the purview of the provincial
governments.
2. Offshore
The Supreme Court of Canada found in the Hibernia Reference21 that
Canada and not Newfoundland has the right to explore and exploit the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of those portions of the
continental shelf in which the Hibernia oil reserves are located. The
20. St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. v. R. (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.) at 57.
21. Hibernia Reference, supra note 6.
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decision applies equally to the entire continental shelf off Newfoundland.
The court was not asked to, and did not, rule on Newfoundland's
territorial sea. In a reference decided just before the Hibernia Reference,
the Newfoundland Court of Appeal determined that the territory of the
Province of Newfoundland includes a three-marine-mile territorial sea.22
But while the decision does govern at the present time, it is clear that if
the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the same line of reasoning in
considering the territorial sea that it adopted in the Hibernia Reference
Canada, not Newfoundland, would be held to enjoy all the proprietary
rights and legislative powers in respect of the three-marine-mile territorial
seas around Newfoundland. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal ruling
proceeds on three principal findings.
First, the court agreed with the Supreme Court of Canada that territo-
rial sea rights were rights created and recognized by international law and
that only a body possessing extraterritorial sovereignty could enjoy them.
Referring to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the 1967 British
Columbia Offshore Reference,23 the Court of Appeal wrote:
The court [Supreme Court of Canada] determined that Canada had
emerged as an independent sovereign state at some point in the period
between its separate signature of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the
Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, (U.K.). Impliedly, on its
attainment of sovereign independence, the rights formerly asserted by the
British Crown in the territorial sea passed to the crown in right of Canada
and Canada thus became the recipient of any rights available under
international law. The court concluded at p. 816:
Canada has now full constitutional capacity to acquire new areas of
territory and new jurisdictional rights which may be available under
international law .24
Secondly, the Court of Appeal characterized Newfoundland in 1930,
the time by which international law recognized a three-marine mile
territorial sea, as an independent dominion. As the court held,
[t]he importance of the events of 1923-26, and in particular the Balfour
Declaration, was the recognition of the independence of the Dominions
including Newfoundland ....
There can be no doubt that by 1930 Newfoundland enjoyed equal status
with Canada and Australia .... 25
22. Reference Re: Mineral and other natural resources of the continental shelf appurtenant
to the province of Newfoundland (1983), 41 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271 (Nfld. C.A.) [hereinafter
Newfoundland Offshore Reference].
23. In the matter of a reference by the governor general in council concerning the ownership
of the jurisdiction over offshore mineral rights as set out in order in council P.C. 1965-750
datedApril26, 1965, [1967] S.C.R. at 792 [hereinafter British Columbia Offshore Reference].
24. Newfoundland Offshore Reference, supra note 22 at 276.
25. Ibid. at 283.
Legal Framework in The Canadian Offshore
Third, the court relied on Newfoundland's Terms of Union, particu-
larly Term 37, to conclude that the rights to the seabed and subsoil of the
territorial sea, acquired by Newfoundland prior to union in its capacity as
an independent dominion enjoying external sovereignty, flowed through
to the Province of Newfoundland on its union with the rest of Canada in
1949:
The significant difference between Term 37 and s. 109 is the omission of
any language from Term 37 confining the resources reserved to New-
foundland to those found within its boundaries as defined in Term 2. The
presumption is that words are not omitted, when they have been used in a
corresponding clause in an earlier statute, without a reason. To give effect
to Term 37, it then, must be construed as a variation of s. 109 of the British
North America Act, 1867 and of having the effect of reserving to the
Province of Newfoundland all proprietary rights both within and outside
the land mass described in Term 2.
In our opinion, the sovereign rights to the bed and subsoil of the territorial
waters of Newfoundland that were vested in The Crown in fight of the
Island of Newfoundland and its dependencies in 1949 remained vested in
The Crown in right of the Province of Newfoundland after Confederation
under the provisions of Term 37 of the Terms of Union.26
In the Hibernia Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the
Court of Appeal's interpretation of s. 37 of the Terms of Union:
We do not attribute the same significance as did the Court of Appeal of
Newfoundland to the specific inclusion of Term 37 nor to the absence of
the words "on which the same are situate or arise" ...
As for the words "in which the same are situate or arise" in s. 109, these
are grammatically necessary because the section dealt originally with
three former colonies becoming four provinces. They have no further
purpose or effect. The property rights being dealt with in s. 109 are public
property rights: A.-G B.C. v. A.-G. Can. (1889), 14 App. Cas. 295 (P.C.)
at 301. The Crown in right of the province holds ultimate title in such
property within the province because it is the Crown. Outside their
boundaries the provinces can hold no such public property .... It would
take much more than the omission of these words from Term 37 of the
Terms of Union to give the Province of Newfoundland the capacity to hold
extra-territorial public property. 7
Accordingly, as the law stands today, Newfoundland has full propri-
etary rights and legislative powers in the first three marine miles of the
territorial sea. Canada enjoys similar rights in the remainder of the
twelve-mile territorial sea and enjoys the rights to explore and exploit the
natural resources of the continental shelf. However, for the reasons above
it is submitted that Newfoundland's tenure of the three-mile limit rests on
26. Ibid. at 291-92.
27. Hibernia Reference, supra note 6 at 409-10.
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a judicial foundation unlikely to be sustained by the Supreme Court of
Canada.
Nova Scotia's rights to the offshore have not been determined judi-
cially. Nova Scotia never acquired the kind of independent dominion
status that Newfoundland held, so that much of the reasoning of the
Hibernia Reference would not be applicable. It is submitted that Nova
Scotia's offshore rights would be determined in the following manner:
(1) Section 7 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provided that Nova Scotia
would have the same limits after confederation that it had
immediately before.
(2) The territorial boundaries of Nova Scotia, as with other British
colonies were set in the applicable governors' commissions. A
governor's commission formed a colony's constitution. Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island were "colo-
nies with Prerogative constitutions, embodied in Royal Procla-
mations and Royal Commissions and Instructions to colonial
Governors. 28
(3) Sometimes a governor's commission would include a detailed
metes and bounds description of the colony over which the
Governor and usually an elected assembly would preside. Some
times the description would be no more than the name of the
colony. The last governor's commission to express detailed
territorial limits of Nova Scotia was that of James, Earl of Elgin,
as Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of Nova Scotia in
1847. In it the territory of Nova Scotia was defined as
being bounded on the Westward by a Line drawn from Cape Sable across
the entrance to the centre of the Bay of Fundy, on the Northward by a Line
drawn along the centre of the same Bay to the mouth of the Musquat River
by the said River to its source and from thence by a due East line across the
Isthmus into the Bay of Verte on the Eastward by the said Bay Verte and
the Gulf of Saint Lawrence to the Cape or Promontory called Cape Breton
in the Island of that name including the said Island and also including all
Islands within six Leagues of the Coast and on the Southward by the
Atlantic Ocean from the said Cape to Cape Sable aforesaid including the
Island of that name and all other Islands within forty Leagues of the Coast
with all the rights members and appurtenances whatsoever thereunto
belonging .... 29
28. W.R. Lederman, "The Extension of Governmental Institutions and Legal Systems to
British North America in the Colonial Period", Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilem-
mas (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) 63 at 69.
29. Archives of Nova Scotia, Oversize collection 333 [emphasis added].
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Subsequent governors' commissions refer merely to Nova Scotia, with-
out giving any territorial definition of the colony. Accordingly, the above
description from the 1847 Elgin Commission defines the territory that
became on July 1, 1867, the Province of Nova Scotia.
(4) The Supreme Court of Canada stated in the Hibernia Reference:
We said earlier that, in pith and substance, continental shelf rights are
extra-territorial rights and a manifestation of external sovereignty. This is
important because of the constitutional position of colonies.30
Extra-territorial legislative incompetence was a hallmark of colonies,
often relied upon by colonial law officers in recommending disallowance
of colonial laws.31
A particular example of the extra-territorial incompetence of colonies is
that they were incapable of acquiring new territory. Boundaries could only
be altered by the British authorities .... 32
(5) Accordingly, the colony of Nova Scotia could not alter or extend its
own boundaries. The limits set by British authorities in 1847 did not
include any of the territorial sea or continental shelf. Upon confed-
eration, the Province of Nova Scotia inherited the limits of the
colony.
(6) By the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada set out in the British
Columbia Offshore Reference and the Hibernia Reference, and
taking into account the circumstances of the pre-confederation colony
of Nova Scotia, it will be virtually impossible to escape the conclu-
sion that Canada, not Nova Scotia, holds the proprietary rights and
legislative powers in the territorial sea and continental shelf off Nova
Scotia.
Finally, a word on the dispute between Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia as to their respective rights in one particular sector of the east coast
offshore area: the Laurentian Basin. The dispute arises because in setting
up the administration of the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore
areas, the federal government passed conflicting legislation.
30. Hibernia Reference, supra note 6 at 398.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. at 399.
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For Newfoundland, the federal government enacted the Newfound-
land Accord Act. That statute does not set fixed boundaries for the
Newfoundland offshore area, which is defined in s. 2:
offshore area means those submarine areas lying seaward of the low water
mark of the Province and extending, at any location, as far as
(a) any prescribed line, or
(b) where no line is prescribed at that location, the outer edge of the
continental margin or a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Canada is
measured, whichever is the greater.
Section 5 gives the federal minister the power to enact regulations setting
lines defining the Newfoundland offshore area. The corresponding
Newfoundland minister has a veto right over any proposed regulation.
No such regulation has ever been made or proposed.
Section 6(2) of the Newfoundland Accord Act is a critical one:
Where a dispute between the Province and any other province that is a
party to an agreement arises in relation to a line or portion thereof
prescribed or to be prescribed for the purpose of the definition "offshore
area" in section 2 and the Government of Canada is unable, by means of
negotiation, to bring about a resolution of the dispute within a reasonable
time, the dispute shall, at such time as the Federal Minister deems
appropriate, be referred to an impartial person, tribunal or body and settled
by means of the procedure determined in accordance with subsection (3).
A s. 6(2) "dispute", then, is only a dispute arising in relation to a boundary
line prescribed or to be prescribed by the federal minister under the
Newfoundland Act. Section 6(4) provides that any dispute settlement
procedure will require the arbitrator to apply the principles of interna-
tional law governing maritime boundary delimitation.
On the Nova Scotia side, the offshore area boundary was more precise.
"Offshore area" is defined in s. 2 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act as the
"lands and submarine areas within the limits described in Schedule I."
Schedule I sets out a metes and bounds description, including a line
through the Laurentian channel between Nova Scotia and Newfound-
land. Section 48 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act compares to s. 6 of the
Newfoundland Act. Under s. 48(2) an arbitration may be convened where
there is an unresolved dispute arising in relation to the Schedule I
boundaries.
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IV. Basic Agreements
1. Onshore
a. The Oil and Gas Lease
In the opinion of Kellock J. writing for the majority in Berkheiser v.
Berkheiser,33 the standard oil and gas lease is to be construed as a grant
of a profit a prendre for an uncertain term.34 Rand J. characterized it as
either a profit t prendre or an irrevocable licence to search for and win
hydrocarbons,3" the difference between the two being that a profit t
prendre is an interest in land, whereas a licence is a personal right only.
With the ascension of the absolute ownership theory, Rand J.'s doubts
about the nature of an oil and gas lease have become less of a concern over
time, so that it is now firmly established that an appropriately worded oil
and gas lease creates a profit ii prendre, a real property right.
b. Royalty
It is now equally clear that a royalty - either a lessor royalty, a gross
overriding royalty or a net profits royalty - can be an interest in land.36
Two factors will determine whether a particular oil and gas lease or a
-particular royalty creates an interest in land or a personal right only:
(1) Whether the person proposing to dispose of the interest has an interest
in land out of which the proposed interest may be carved. Resolving
this issue may involve tracing the grantor's interest back to a Crown
grant, fee simple deed or a lesser estate.
(2) Whether the parties involved in the transaction intended to convey
and receive an interest in land.37
2. Offshore
a. Licences
Under the Accord Acts, there are three classes of licence, given sequen-
tially, which together cover activities covered onshore by the standard oil
and gas lease: exploration licences, significant discovery licences and
production licences. An exploration licence confers on the holder the
right to explore, the exclusive right to drill, the exclusive right to develop
and the exclusive right to obtain a production licence over identified
portions of the offshore area.38 A significant discovery licence, obtain-
33. [1957] S.C.R. 387.
34. Ibid. at 399.
35. Ibid.
36. Scurry Rainbow Oil v. Galloway Estate, [1995] 1 W.W.R. 316 (Alta. C.A.) and Bank of
Montreal v. Dynex Petroleum, [2000] 2 W.W.R. 693 (Alta. C.A.).
37. See Dynex Petroleum, ibid. at 713-14.
38. Nova Scotia AccordAct, supra note 19, s. 68; NewfoundlandAccordAct, supra note 18, s. 65.
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able after a significant discovery has been declared, carries the same basic
rights as an exploration licence. The main difference is that a significant
discovery licence does not have an expiry date; subject to certain
requirements it will continue indefinitely. 39 A production licence, obtain-
able after a commercial discovery has been declared, carries, in addition
to all the rights in an exploration or a significant disco-very licence, the
exclusive right to produce petroleum and title to the petroleum so
produced.4°
An adapted version of the same two-step process for determining the
legal character of an onshore oil and gas lease or royalty will perform the
same function in the offshore. The adapted steps are:
(1) Whether the Crown has real property rights in the offshore area. As
discussed above, this issue has not been resolved and will be
determined by the necessities of oil and gas exploration, develop-
ment and production in the continental shelf balanced against navi-
gation, communications and other international interests.
(2) Whether the Crown intended through the Accord Acts to confer on
holders of exploration, significant discovery and production licences
interests in land.
If the right to explore and exploit the continental shelf does not create
real property rights, then the second question is moot and all interests are
personal only. If the Crown does enjoy real property rights in the
continental shelf, the rights conferred by the licences on holders must be
reviewed to determine whether the Crown has passed on any of such
rights. It is submitted that given the use of "licence" instead of "grant"
in the Accord Acts, holders of exploration and significant discovery
licences probably have no real property rights. Holders of production
licences will have no in situ ownership rights but may have real property
rights equivalent to a profit a prendre.
b. Royalties
As for royalties, it is hard to imagine a holder of a production licence, who
acquires title to petroleum only after it is produced, granting a real
property royalty. Employing the two-step process, the proposed grantor's
own right must first be examined to see whether the proposed royalty can
issue from an existing real property interest. Then the intention of the
parties must be analyzed to determine the quality of the rights the grantor
intended to convey. The holder of an exploration or significant discovery
licence likely has no claim to any real property interest whatsoever, and
39. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 75; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 72.
40. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 83; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 80.
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the holder of a production licence has no title to any petroleum until it has
been produced.
Based on the uncertain characterization of the international right to
explore and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf, and the
fairly clear lack of intention to create by legislation rights in real property,
it is difficult to see how an offshore royalty could be considered to be a
real property right.
3. Summary
Onshore the law has become clearer. Oil and gas leases and royalties can
be interests in land if the grantor had a real property interest from which
to grant a real property oil and gas lease or royalty, and if the parties
intended to create such an interest.
Offshore, uncertainties in classifying Canada's sovereign continental
shelf rights creates difficulties in classifying exploration, significant
discovery and production licences, together with royalties which flow
from them. We do know, however, that Canada's rights in the continental
shelf are much more restricted than the full set of sovereign onshore
rights, and we do know that the Accord Acts refer to licences instead of
grants and to title in produced petroleum instead of in situ petroleum.
These indications tend to lead to a characterization of offshore licences
and royalties as personal rights only.
V. Application of Laws
1. Onshore
Sections 91, 92 and 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867 set out a compre-
hensive code defining which level of government may enact laws
concerning which subjects, in the onshore context.
2. Offshore
Because the continental shelf is outside the territorial boundaries of
Canada, provincial law does not apply and federal law, because of the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of legislation,41 only
applies if it is so extended expressly or by necessary implication. A
number of federal statutes have purported to extend certain federal laws
41. R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1994) at 334.
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into the offshore area, but most of these provisions may be considered as
superseded by s. 20 of the Oceans Act, which provides as follows:
20. (1) Subject to any regulations made pursuant to paragraph 26(1)0) or
(k), federal laws apply
(a) on or under any marine installation or structure from the time it
is attached or anchored to the continental shelf of Canada in
connection with the exploration of that shelf or the exploitation of its
mineral or other non-living resources until the marine installation or
structure is removed from the waters above the continental shelf of
Canada;
(b) on or under any artificial island constructed, erected or placed on
the continental shelf of Canada; and
(c) within such safety zone surrounding any marine installation or
structure or artificial island referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) as is
determined by or pursuant to the regulations.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), federal laws shall be applied
(a) as if the places referred to in that subsection formed part of the
territory of Canada;
(b) notwithstanding that by their terms their application is limited to
Canada; and
(c) in a manner that is consistent with the rights and freedoms of
other states under international law and, in particular, with the rights
and freedoms of other states in relation to navigation and overflight.
The effect of this declaration of jurisdiction is to confirm that all federal
law applies in the continental shelf in a manner consistent with Canada's
rights to explore and exploit its natural resources.
By virtue of the maritime nature of continental shelf activities, mari-
time law, a separate body of federal statute and common law, applies to
the exploration and exploitation of natural resources on the continental
shelf. Section 9 of the OceansAct provides that provincial laws will apply
in areas of the sea prescribed by regulation, but to date no such regulations
have been promulgated. Since the offshore area is beyond the boundaries
of a province and since provincial laws only apply of their own force
within the province, the application of provincial law in the offshore area
can only occur through federal declaration.
The Accord Acts have incorporated by reference certain named pro-
vincial statutes dealing with social legislation - workers' compensation,
labour relations, occupational health and safety - and, because Ottawa
has agreed that normal resource revenues accruing to government in the
offshore will belong to the provinces as if they had occurred onshore,
provincial statutes dealing with taxes and royalties. Also, in the New-
foundland offshore, provincial security legislation-primarily the Per-
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sonal Property Security Act,42 is made applicable by virtue of the federal
Hibernia Development Project Act.43 But without incorporation by
reference in federal legislation, no provincial legislation applies in the
offshore area. Of all the legislation which does apply on the continental
shelf off the east coast of Canada, the Accord Acts have the greatest
importance for oil and gas activities. They contain a comprehensive
regulatory code, the principal features of which are:
(1) The establishment ofjoint federal and provincial offshore petroleum
boards.
(2) The granting of exploration, significant discovery and production
licences, and the administration of those rights.
(3) The provision of a registry system for establishing the proof and
priority of interests in exploration, significant discovery and produc-
tion licences, together with assignments and transfers.
(4) The establishment of criteria for the grant of development and
production rights.
(5) Setting of offshore crown royalties and other fiscal matters.
(6) Providing for the protection of the environment and the health and
safety of workers and property in the offshore.
(7) Supervision of petroleum operations.
3. Summary
The normal onshore ss. 91-92 division of legislative powers does not
apply in the continental shelf where the provinces simply have no
jurisdiction. This legislative gap is narrowed to some extent by the
federal government incorporating certain specific provincial legislation
by reference. Of prime importance for oil and gas activities in the offshore
area are the Accord Acts.
Conclusion
These comparisons show major differences between the onshore and
offshore legal regimes. Many of the differences stem from the narrower
bundle of resource rights Canada recognizes in the continental shelf. The
full panoply of sovereign rights onshore leads to the fee simple deed and
on to the absolute ownership theory of oil and gas, and on to the
characterization of oil and gas leases and royalties as capable of being
interests in land. The narrower right to explore and exploit the natural
resources of the continental shelf leads to sovereign rights which are not
42. S.N. 1999,c.P-7.1.
43. S.C. 1990, c. 41.
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proprietary in the ordinary sense and on to uncertainty in the character-
ization of licences to explore and produce petroleum.
Some of the differences flow from the constitutional exclusion of the
provinces exercising proprietary rights (such as they are) or legislative
powers in the offshore areas, which leads to federal incorporation by
reference of a number of provincial laws and on to legislative gaps in
other areas usually within provincial control. Careful practitioners will
keep these differences in mind in advising clients, drafting documents
and giving opinions relating to oil and gas activities off the east coast of
Canada.
